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The Challenge of the F.T.A.--Chapter 19
Jonathan T. Fried *
Bil Merkin and I have been asked to "set the stage" for today's discus-
sion by reviewing the history of FTA 1 negotiations, with particular
emphasis on the manner in which the two governments considered the
relationship between trade and competition policies. Our panel is appro-
priately entitled "The Challenge of the FTA," for the issue of trade rem-
edies, or "contingency protection,"' proved to be among the most
difficult in the negotiations.
In my remarks, I propose to offer a Canadian perspective on three
aspects of the negotiations. First, what were the Canadian objectives in
seeking bilateral trade negotiations with the United States pursuant to
Prime Minister Mulroney's formal request of December 10, 1985? 3 Sec-
ondly, in the light of these objectives, what, if anything, was achieved
during the negotiations on the issue of antidumping and its relationship
with the competition laws of both countries? Thirdly, where does the
work of the Working Group on trade remedies, created by Article 1907
of the FTA, currently stand?
CANADIAN OBJECTIVES IN FREE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
A brief review of the reasons for Canada seeking free trade negotia-
tions, and of the kind of agreement Canada sought, provides the founda-
tion for any analysis of the role of antidumping and competition policy
under the FTA.
As everyone here knows, Canada is a trading nation. One-third of
our GNP is derived from trade. Over half of the goods we produce are
exported, and over half of the goods consumed in Canada are imported.
"Open and secure access" to export markets has, accordingly, always
been given a high priority by successive Canadian governments, for with-
out such access, and with a small domestic market, continued investment
in Canada cannot be assured.
And as everyone here knows, the United States is Canada's most
important trading partner, accounting for over three-quarters of our ex-
• Counselor for Congressional and Legal Affairs, Canadian Embassy (Washington, D.C.).
I Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Done at Ottawa, Ontario and Palm Beach, Ca. on Janu-
ary 2, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "FTA"), Art. 1907.
2 Grey, United States Trade Policy Legislation: A Canadian View, Montreal, Institute for Re-
search on Public Policy, 1982.
3 Canadian Trade Negotiations: Introduction, Selected Documents. Further Reading, Depart-
ment of Supply and Services (Ottawa, 1986).
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ports. With Canada consuming close to 25 percent of all U.S. exports,
Business Week reported that the two countries constitute a $5 trillion
continental economy that is 15 percent larger than the economy of the
European Community.
For close to forty years, Canada depended on the GATT to secure
our access to world markets. In each of the seven rounds of trade-liberal-
izing multilateral trade negotiations, the most critical part of the discus-
sions for Canada was the Canada-U.S. dimension.
With the failure of the GATT Ministerial Meeting in 1982 and in-
creased protectionism accompanying a global contraction, the Liberal
Trudeau government decided in 1983 to explore whether several out-
standing issues between Canada and the United States could be settled
through agreements in individual sectors, including steel, urban transit
equipment, agricultural inputs and equipment, and informatics. "Both
governments attacked the problem with enthusiasm, but at the end of a
year concluded that, while the objective was sound, the means were inad-
equate. It was too difficult to find a match of sectors where both coun-
tries saw advantages."4
Shortly after taking office in the fall of 1984, the Mulroney govern-
ment began a complete review of its trade and economic policy. In an
Economic and Fiscal Statement issued in November, 1984, the govern-
ment undertook to "examine... in close consultation with the provinces
and the private sector all avenues to secure and enhance market access."
In January, 1985, the government published How to Secure and Enhance
Canadian Access to Export Markets: A Discussion Paper, as the basis for
private sector consultations on multilateral trade negotiations and op-
tions for Canada-U.S. trade. The Paper set out four options for bilateral
trade, including (1) maintaining the status quo, (2) negotiating sectorial
agreements, as had been attempted in 1983, (3) developing a "frame-
work" agreement, to establish objectives for the consolidation of bilateral
trade relations, to be conducted under the auspices of an institutional
mechanism such as a "Trade Consultative Committee," and (4) negotiat-
ing a comprehensive agreement for the removal of tariff and non-tariff
barriers on substantially all the trade.
An important element of the government's consideration of trade
policy options was the changing composition of Canadian trade. Studies
prepared for the "Macdonald Commission"' concluded that while Can-
ada enjoys a comparative advantage in world markets for resource-based
products, "world market prospects for resource products are for slow
4 Hart, "The Future on the Table: The Continuing Agenda under the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement," chapter IV in Living with Free Trade: Canada, the Free Trade Agreement
and the GATT (Dearden, Hart, Steger, eds.), Ottawa, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989.
5 Final Report, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for
Canada, Ottawa, Department of Supply and Services, 1985.
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growth with over-capacity and new competition."6 Exposure to market-
oriented international competition would facilitate the process of struc-
tural adjustment and domestic economic reform necessary to gain higher
earnings and the growth necessary to achieve dynamic efficiencies. Free
trade would, by forcing the domestic market to be more competitive
against increased competition from abroad, thereby promote the compar-
ative advantage that would enable Canadians to maintain their standard
of living.
On March 19, 1985, at the Quebec Summit, President Reagan and
Prime Minister Mulroney directed their respective trade ministers "to
chart all possible ways to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade
and to report within six months." The decision to begin free trade dis-
cussions with the United States was announced by Prime Minister Mul-
roney in September, 1985.
In sum, Canadian objectives in entering free trade negotiations were
two-fold: first, to obtain secure and open access to its most important
market, and secondly, to promote domestic economic reform by estab-
lishing a framework of rules supportive of market-oriented competition,
both domestic and international.
THE PREOCCUPATION WITH CONTINGENCY PROTECTION
The universe of U.S. trade remedy laws was seen by many Canadian
businesses as a significant obstacle to securing access to the U.S. market.
A series of U.S. statutes-the Trade Act of 1974,7 the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979,8 and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 9-facilitated the use
of trade remedy laws by U.S. petitioners in the 1980's. By 1987, when
free trade negotiations were under way, U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws were up for further revision in what became the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.1° In Canadian eyes,
successive amendments engendered a "litigation bias" that encouraged
U.S. firms to use trade remedies as an ordinary tool of business strategy,
e.g., to "buy time" against a competitor.
In absolute terms, the number of cases involved was relatively small.
Although over the last decade Canadians filed more than twice as many
cases against U.S. imports as Americans filed against Canadian products,
it is at least arguable that Canadian industry has been more at risk under
the current regime. From 1980 through 1987, U.S. industries filed six-
6 Dymond, Canada-U.S. Trade Options: A View from the Canadian Side, 10 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 27
(1985).
7 Trade Act of 1974, January 3rd, 1975, P.L. 93-618 88 Stat. 1978 (19 USC 2101 et seq.).
8 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, July 26th, 1979, P.L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (19 USC 2501 et
seq.).
9 Trade and TariffAct of 1984, October 30th, 1984, P.L. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (19 USC 1654
note).
10 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, August 23rd, 1988, P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (19 USC 2901 note).
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teen antidumping cases against Canadian products. Nine resulted in an-
tidumping duty orders or suspension agreements. Including the
suspension agreement on potash, well over $100 million in annual trade
from Canada was involved.1 It is interesting to note that during the
same period, forty antidumping cases were brought in Canada against
U.S. products. Again, about half resulted in affirmative findings or un-
dertakings, but trade volumes were significantly smaller. 2
But the number of cases does not tell the whole story, for several
reasons. First, the potential exposure to U.S. trade -emedies denied Ca-
nadian firms the security of access necessary to pro-competitive decision-
making. Pricing of products, marketing strategies and other corporate
behavior were unduly influenced by the need to minimize the risk of fac-
ing a trade remedy action in the United States. Secondly, this uncer-
tainty was seen as having a chilling effect on inward investment. Thirdly,
even though the overall volume of trade potentially affected by the cases
brought was small compared to the size of the bilateral trade relation-
ship, the potential impact on individual regions and industries in Canada
was much larger. Fish is the mainstay of the Atlantic provinces' econ-
omy, for example, and steel is critical to central Ontario. U.S. use (and
abuse) of countervailing duty law raised even more profound difficulties
for the Canadian government and industry. 3
Fundamental reform of the U.S. contingency protection regime be-
came, therefore, a major element in the Canadian "vision" of a free trade
area that would afford Canadian firms secure access to the U.S. market
and that would promote competition in Canada.
ANTIDUMPING IN THE FREE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
In analyzing the root causes of Canadian difficulties with U.S. an-
tidumping laws, Canadian negotiators assessed the origins of the an-
tidumping laws and the practices they were designed to address. In both
countries, the antidumping laws were originally conceived as an exten-
11 See the discussion in Powell, "Antidumping Law and the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment: Possible Next Steps," in U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: The Economic and Legal Impli-
cations (American Bar Association national Institute, January, 1988).
12 Figures for countervailing duty cases are similar. From 1980 through 1987, U.S. industries
filed over 300 CVD cases, of which 11 were against Canadian products. Five of the 11-involving
live swine, raspberries, groundfish, oil country tubular goods, and cut flowers-led to CVD orders.
Six other cases either led to negative subsidy or injury findings or were withdrawn. While the CVD
orders covered only some $180 million in trade (based on 1986 import values), the second lumber
case, which was resolved by a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding between the two coun-
tries, by itself involved trade of about $2.7 billion. In Canada, from the passage of the Special
Import Measures Act in 1984 through 1987, Canadian industries had filed a total of only eleven
CVD cases, and only one-the corn case filed in 1986-was against U.S. products. See Anderson
and Fried, "Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement," in
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sion of domestic competition laws.14 They were aimed at cases of inter-
national price discrimination that could not be reached by domestic
legislation.
Canadian negotiators came to the conclusion that both in their defi-
nition and application, the U.S. antidumping law as it would be applied
in a free trade area would improperly fail to differentiate between abuse
of foreign market power and legitimate pricing responses to varying con-
ditions in the two countries' markets.' 5 The law would keep within its
ambit legitimate business practices, such as lower pricing to establish a
toehold in a particular market or to meet lower cost competitors who
themselves may be selling below variable cost. Other anti-competitive
pricing practices, for example to establish or maintain a dominant posi-
tion by eliminating or deterring entry, or by engaging in predatory pric-
ing, should continue to be deterred and disciplined.
Aided by significant scholarly work, 6 intergovernmental study,' 7
and the precedent of other free trade areas,' 8 the Canadian side therefore
proposed that, once the free trade agreement was fully implemented, the
two governments would deal with anti-competitive private pricing prac-
tices under domestic predatory pricing and price discrimination laws
rather than under antidumping laws.
The U.S. side agreed only to further explore the ramifications of the
Canadian proposal. A Technical Group on Antidumping and Competi-
tion Laws was created, and in workmanlike fashion completed a reason-
ably comprehensive examination of issues raised. Each side prepared a
comparison of antidumping and price discrimination and predatory pric-
ing laws, examined the substantive changes that might be required in
their respective competition laws to cover appropriate cross-border trans-
actions, considered whether changes in investigation and enforcement
rules and policies would be necessary, and identified the prospect of in-
creased dumping by third country producers as an issue deserving of at-
tention. Neither side identified any technical impediment to eliminating
the application of antidumping to bilateral trade or to making appropri-
ate changes to competition laws and policies.
Lack of adequate progress on the politically volatile issue of subsi-
14 The first U.S. statute focused on predatory price discrimination, and required a showing that
lower prices were charged "with the intent to destroy or injure an industry." U.S. Revenue Act of
1916, s. 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916).
15 Palmeter, "The Capture of the Antidumping Law" 14 Yale J. Int'l L. 182 (1989).
16 See Hart, supra note 4, at 114-115.
17 Competition and Trade Policies, Their Interaction, OECD, 1984.
18 Within the European Community, anti-competitive pricing practices by private firms are
dealt with under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. Antidumping remedies are available only against
imports from outside the EC. At the time of the FTA negotiations, the European Community and
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were already discussing the elimination of antidump-
ing remedies on trade between them, as were Australia and New Zealand under their Closer Eco-
nomic Relations free trade agreement. In fact, these remedies were eliminated between Australia
and New Zealand in 1988, and EFTA-EC discussions are continuing.
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dies and countervailing duties, and the political resistance in the United
States (evident during the 1987 and 1988 Congressional debate on the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act) to any perceived weakening of
U.S. trade laws, combined to prevent the two governments from reaching
a policy decision on antidumping and competition laws. Chapter 19 of
the FTA, a clear compromise, did, however, represent significant pro-
gress in at least two respects. First, it represents recognition by the
United States ". . . for the first time that disputes between the two coun-
tries are not a matter for the application of domestic law and unilateral
decisions alone, but should be subject to bilateral dispute settlement." 19
Secondly, Article 1907 established a Working Group to develop "more
effective rules and disciplines concerning the use of government subsi-
dies" and "a substitute system of rules for dealing with unfair pricing and
government subsidization.
20
ANTIDUMPING IN THE SUBSIDIES AND TRADE
REMEDIES WORKING GROUP
The FTA came into force on January 1, 1989, and with it, the
Working Group contemplated by Art. 1907 came into being. Senior offi-
cials of both governments agreed at an early stage that it behooved both
Canada and the United States to give highest priority to achieving pro-
gress on the issues of unfair pricing, government subsidies and trade rem-
edies in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This is
not to say that no further progress has been made bilaterally, however.
In fact, both sides have pursued extensive preparatory work on the
issue of antidumping and competition laws in a free trade area. In Can-
ada, negotiators have conducted exhaustive research on the issues identi-
fied during the negotiations in the Technical Working Group, and more
importantly, have engaged in ongoing consultation with the private sec-
tor on these issues.
Even in a free trade area, cross-border price discrimination can oc-
cur as a result of practices by foreign firms that would be found to be
anti-competitive under domestic law. But in the Canadian view, re-
straints to trade-such as tariff and non-tariff barriers-have been re-
sponsible, in part, for making the segregation of markets possible. The
removal of tariffs on all goods traded between Canada and the United
States and the elimination of a host of major non-tariff barriers as con-
templated by the FTA would remove one of the main factors creating
segmentation of markets and thus tend to produce similar price struc-
tures throughout the two economies. Admittedly, however, distribution
19 Hart, supra note 4, at 76. FTA article 1904 establishes a system of binational judicial review
of domestic final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. Article 1902
places limits on amendments to these laws, made subject to binational review of a declaratory, advi-
sory nature pursuant to Article 1903.
20 FTA, Article 1907.
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arrangements, intellectual property rights and differences in labelling re-
quirements and other regulatory regimes will continue to contribute to
some segregation of the two markets.
In the United States, the U.S. Congress expressed its view on future
working group discussions in the U.S. legislation implementing the
FTA.2" Section 409(a) would appear to deny "fast track""z implementa-
tion to any bill or resolution implementing an agreement of the Working
Group unless the President "determines and notifies the Congress that
such agreement (A) will provide.., no less discipline over unfair pricing
practices by producers" than that provided under current U.S. an-
tidumping law. U.S. officials reiterated certain concerns soon after the
FTA entered into force.2 3 Nevertheless, the U.S. side, too, has actively
pursued further research and consultation while awaiting the results of
the Uruguay Round.
Where are we today? Both governments, I believe, are committed to
supporting a continued free airing of ideas. This conference represents a
thoughtful and constructive contribution to the continuing process of
consultation. The most important topic for consultation may well be
whether there is genuine support in the business community for pursuing
the replacement option. Given the cogency of the analysis presented in
the study paper before you and the technical work already done by the
two governments, and in view of continued opposition by certain special
interests in the United States to any modification to the antidumping
laws, and in the wake of the apparent collapse of the Uruguay Round
and the unlikely prospect for significant reform of antidumping remedies
in that forum, I would suggest that the two governments are most inter-
ested in listening to your views.
Today's conference can, and should, help to answer the question of
support. I congratulate the Chambers of Commerce and the Canada-
U.S. Law Institute for undertaking this important initiative, and look
forward to the day's discussion.
21 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, P.L. 100-449 (1988).
22 Trade Act of 1974 as amended, 19 USC 2101-2487, sec. 2111 if.
23 Powell, supra note 11.
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